Industrial Entanglements and Their Political Outflows in the Japan-South Africa Relationship in the Mid-Twentieth Century by Scarlett Cornelissen
Industrial Entanglements and Their Political
Outflows in the Japan-South Africa
Relationship in the Mid-Twentieth Century
著者 Scarlett Cornelissen
journal or
publication title
關西大學經済論集
volume 67
number 4
page range 501-515
year 2018-03-10
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10112/16855
55
Articles
Industrial Entanglements and Their Political 
Outflows in the Japan-South Africa Relationship
in the Mid-Twentieth Century1）
Scarlett Cornelissen2）
Abstract
For much of the twentieth Century ‘the South Africa question’ stood central in 
Japan’s relationship with the African continent. This refers in essence to how Japanese 
authorities’ and firms’ dealings with the apartheid regime from roughly the late 1950s 
to the late 1980s framed Japan’s relations with the larger continent in complex ways. 
This paper engages this period and focuses on an aspect of the Japan-South Africa 
relationship that has not received that much attention in scholarship – that is, the 
industrial links forged alongside trade ties and how these reflected industrialisation 
processes in both Japan and South Africa at the time. The paper discusses the 
geo-institutional conditions under which economic and industrial ties came to be 
fashioned and the material and political outflows they brought. It offers discussion of 
direct and indirect Japanese involvement in industrialisation processes in South Africa 
in the 1960s and 1970s through the lens of South Africa’s manufacturing sector and 
attempts towards import-substitution industrialisation. Through the tracing of the rise 
of Toyota South Africa, it is illustrated how political-economic processes in apartheid 
South Africa – in which Japanese capital and industrial links played an indirect role – 
were intertwined with the bolstering of an Afrikaner industrialist class. The discussion 
aims to unpack the broad dimensions of Japan-South Africa relations, well-covered 
in existing literature, by showing how diplomacy meshed with industrialisation and 
economic processes on both sides, and highlighting the role of specific figures, such as 
the founder of Toyota South Africa, in forging relations in more nuanced ways than 
usually recognised in the literature.
Article Classification Code: Economic History
1 ） Part of the research for this paper was conducted while I was a fellow with the Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University （Fall 2016-2017） and the Stellenbosch 
Institute for Advanced Study （January – September 2016）. I would like to thank the directors 
and staff at both institutes for their support of this project and availing their resources.
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Introduction
In one of his seminal contributions to the study of Japan-Africa relations, Professor 
Katsuhiko Kitagawa presented a discussion of the expansion of economic ties between 
Africa and Japan during the interwar period, based on his study of Japanese consular 
reports （Kitagawa, 1990; also see Kitagawa 2006）. At the time, as Professor Kitagawa 
rightly noted, the academic study of Japan-Africa relations was limited. Since then 
contributions by a range of scholars have led to a steady growth of the academic field. 
These include the insightful analyses of, among others, Alden and Hirano （2003）; Adem 
（2010）; Amakasu Raposo （2014）; Ampiah （1997）; Bradshaw and Ransdell （2011）; 
Furukawa （1991）; Lehman （2010）; Lumumba-Kasongo （2010）; Morikawa （1997）; and 
Osada （2002）. Themes covered in these works relate principally to the historical and 
contemporary dynamics in the diplomatic, political, economic and aid relationships between 
Japan and the African continent.
This paper discusses a rather neglected aspect in what is otherwise a solid research base 
on the connections between Africa and Japan. This is the industrial links forged in the 
expansion of trade ties and the way that these links reflected industrialisation processes 
in both Japan and Africa. The focus is on Japan’s twentieth Century relations with South 
Africa up to the late 1970s and involves discussion of the interrelationship in the industrial 
dynamics in both these states. The paper gives an account of the fostering of economic 
links between the two states against the backdrop of the key moments in the political-
economic development of South Africa and Japan in the twentieth Century. It explores the 
geo-institutional conditions that shaped economic relations between the two and discusses 
some of the longer-term material and political outflows of the expanding economic and 
industrial links that were forged.
The first part of the paper presents a brief overview of the key facets of the relationship 
between Japan and the Union of South Africa up to the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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The second part discusses some of the major dynamics in the economic and industrial 
relations that were forged between Japan and the new apartheid state that came into 
existence in 1948. In this part, attention is given to direct and indirect Japanese involve-
ment in industrialisation processes in South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s through the lens 
of South Africa’s manufacturing sector and attempts towards import-substitution industri-
alisation. The political context and resulting complicated nature of the Japan-South Africa 
relationship is also discussed. In the third part, account is given of the rise of Toyota South 
Africa and the role of its founder, Albert Wessels, in bringing Japanese automobile manu-
facturing to South Africa. This account illustrates how industrialisation processes at the 
time meshed with larger scale socio-political processes that included the bolstering of an 
Afrikaner industrialist class. A brief concluding part reflects on some areas for further re-
search.
The pre- and interwar years
Africa’s place in Japan’s Meiji-era modernisation has been documented in the work of 
scholars such as Aoki （2000） and Furukawa （1991）. Parallel processes at the time- 
a weltanschaung that gave preference to Europe’s powers and experiences of state-
making, growing protectiveness by these European forces over their markets in African 
colonies, and geopolitical conditions – meant that Meiji Japan looked towards specifically 
two African countries as potential trading partners, Egypt and South Africa （Kitagawa, 
1990; Morikawa, 1985）. In 1910 the Japanese government appointed an honorary consul, 
a South African of German descent, Julius Jeppe, stationed in Cape Town, to look after 
the growing economic concerns held at the Cape by some of Japan’s major sogo shosha. 
In August 1918 a Consulate was opened in Cape Town, the first Japanese government 
mission to be established on the African continent. This was followed by the establishment 
of a Consulate in Port Said in 1919 and Alexandria in 1926, and in the 1930s, in Mombasa, 
Addis Ababa and Casablanca （Mizobe, 2017; Kitagawa, 1990）.
In the interwar years Japan started to fashion trade links with a number of African 
countries centred on the export of Japanese cotton and some other textiles. This was to 
the extent that by the mid-1930s Japan-made cotton constituted the largest portion of the 
cotton textile markets in East African states such as Kenya and Uganda, and that the 
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majority of apparel such as shirts, hosiery, undergarments, as well as shoes, imported in 
East Africa were from Japan （Bradshaw and Ransdell, 2011）.
The increased presence of these Japanese goods in East African markets as well as in 
the Congo Basin in the interwar period had much to with the growing textile trade war 
between Japan and the British Empire （Howe, 1996; Kitagawa, 2006）. A key part of the 
development of Japanese industry in the late nineteenth Century, the Japanese textile 
sector had undercut British and later also Indian dominance in world markets. This was 
partly driven by technological advances such as the adaptation of the loom by small-scale, 
family-based Japanese textile manufacturers; partly driven by a culture that saw workers 
engaged for much longer hours than their British counterparts （Chokki, 1998）; and in 
the early twentieth Century, partly driven by Japanese manufacturers’ discovery of the 
African market （Prestholdt, 2015）.
Lower prices for Japanese textile goods meant they were popular among African 
merchants and consumers, much to the chagrin of British manufacturers who accused 
the Japanese of ‘dumping’ in their colonial markets. This led to a robust ‘Yellow Peril’ 
discourse on the dangers of Japanese trade and commodities in Africa, a discourse that 
circulated not only in Britain, but also the Union of South Africa. In the case of the latter, 
several factors contributed to negative sentiments towards Japanese trade goods finding 
their way to South Africa. First, during the interwar years South Africa’s agricultural 
economy had mixed experiences. A strong wool export sector built up from the previous 
century was negatively affected by the downturn in the international commodity market 
following the depression years of the late 1920s. Booms witnessed in niche markets such 
as ostrich feathers proved to be relatively short-lived, in part affected by the advent of 
the motor car and concomitant changes in consumer tastes （Du Plessis, 1964: 34）. There 
was a growing trend towards urbanisation among the rural white population which had its 
ramifications for the agricultural sector. 
Second, was a longstanding anti-Asian sentiment with roots in the previous century 
when, in lieu of the labour shortage sparked by the Anglo-Boer War （1899-1902）, mining 
corporations imported around 50,000 Chinese workers. This decision provoked opposition 
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particularly from Afrikaner leaders for whom reducing the number of Chinese workers in 
the Boer Republics after the Anglo-Boer War became one of their key focuses （Du Plessis, 
1964; also see discussion in Harris, 2010）. The adoption of the 1913 Immigration Act, which 
set out to limit immigration from Asia to South Africa, was part of a general anti-Asian 
sentiment prevailing in the Union; it had clear implications for Japan’s growing trade and 
commercial links with South Africa （Morikawa, 1985）.
The strong entry of Japanese goods into the Union of South Africa during the 1930s 
provoked calls from South African business interests to introduce a boycott. At the time 
a range of goods from Japan including textiles, shoes and other consumer goods were 
finding their way to the South African market and stimulated fears that these would harm 
the nascent manufacturing industry （see overview in Rogerson, 1993）. With the advent of 
the Second World War and before this, the imposition of protectionist trade policies by the 
British, Japan lost its dominance in African colonial markets. For around two decades in 
the early twentieth Century, however, Japanese goods fashioned consumer tastes in a few 
East African coastal cities, influenced local economies there, and helped reshape some key 
aspects of these African countries’ economic relations with the British Empire （Prestholdt, 
2015）.
Relations with an industrialising apartheid state
In the era after 1945 both Japan and South Africa saw industrial transformations that 
affected their relationship with each other. Politics, of course, also had a formative role. 
Specifically, closer economic links between Japan and South Africa arose in the 1960s, an 
era in which the apartheid state became more strongly consolidated, but also one in which 
domestic anti-apartheid opposition grew in force. Following the Sharpeville Massacre of 
1960, the banning of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and other 
black nationalist political parties, South Africa entered a period of isolation and growing 
censure of its policies by erstwhile western allies （Barber and Barrett, 1990; Geldenhuys, 
1984）. It was however also a time of economic and industrial expansion.
At the same time, Japan’s post-war ‘economic miracle’ （however intricate this process 
was） had industrial contingents of significance for South African industry. What 
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underpinned this was mutual strategic reliance. The expansion of major manufacturing in 
Japan required the importing of vital resources that Japan lacked and South Africa had 
abundance of. Platinum, in particular, became one of the key export goods from South 
Africa. For much of the apartheid era this was the major traded commodity, making 
up around three-quarters of all goods traded between South Africa and Japan. Platinum 
is a metal with wide application, used in industries ranging from the automotive sector 
（for instance for catalytic converters）, in shipping, and nuclear power generation, among 
others. South Africa holds the world’s largest reserves of platinum. Other primary 
commodities that became important in the Japan-South Africa trade relationship included 
iron ore, uranium ore, manganese, coal and chromium. Kitazawa （1974: 37） notes that in 
the period 1960-1970, trade between Japan and South Africa grew by 500%.
It is noteworthy therefore, that as South Africa came to establish its own industrial basis– 
one that in the apartheid era took a distinctly racialised form （what some scholars have 
termed ‘racial Fordism’ [e.g. Gelb, 1991]）, Japanese firms played a role in this process 
that varied in the directness of the involvement, but nonetheless had implications. Some 
firms, for instance, sought to take advantage of the development of industrial projects that 
mapped onto the Bantustan system. A 1963 report in a South African business journal 
noted that given a 500% differential in the costs of Japanese and black South African 
labour, ‘is it little wonder that Japanese entrepreneurs are so keen to take part in South 
Africa’s Bantustan border industry plans and erect textile factories within easy range of 
the Republic’s vast African labour reserves’ （cited in Rogerson, 1993: 102）. 
Although of strategic necessity for the South African apartheid regime, this economic 
involvement by the Japanese also created complications. There was the question of how 
to accommodate the Japanese businessmen and diplomats resident in the country within 
South Africa’s racial classification system. There was an apparent attempt to address 
this, when in a statement to Parliament on 14 April 1961, Jan de Klerk, then Minister of 
Interior, said: ‘Vir die doeleindes van die Groepsgebiede Wet sal die Japannese as lede 
van die Blanke volk beskou en behandel word’ （‘For the purpose of the Group Areas 
Act members of the Japanese group are regarded and treated as members of the White 
group’）, thus designating them what became popularly termed ‘Honorary Whites’ （or 
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‘Ereblankes’ in Afrikaans）. This was in contrast to the status accorded South Africa’s 
Chinese communities, who in line with the country’s four-tiered classificatory system were 
categorised as a sub-grouping of the ‘Coloured’ race group （or ‘Other Coloured’）. This 
is not to say that Japanese persons resident in South Africa escaped the brunt of ‘petty 
apartheid’ and racial discrimination （see Rogerson, 1993）.
Furthermore, from the 1960s onward Japan’s ties with apartheid South Africa influenced 
the Asian country’s foreign and diplomatic relations and ultimately its foreign policy. The 
Japanese government invited growing criticism from the international community for its 
strong economic position in apartheid South Africa. Apparent support for a white minority 
regime in otherwise decolonising Africa seemed to contrast strongly with Japan’s claim to 
Bandung solidarity. By the 1970s and 1980s Japanese authorities appeared to follow what 
Morikawa （1997） termed a ‘White Africa policy’ and a ‘Black Africa policy’, the latter, in 
the form of a growing aid donor role in sub-Saharan Africa, apparently set in service of the 
former.
Japanese firms’ involvement in South African industry became stronger in the 1970s 
against the backdrop of the minority government’s new industrial development 
programme. This was effectively a programme aimed at South Africa’s rapid 
industrialisation, in part to help bolster the apartheid state. Given South Africa’s growing 
international isolation, the role of large Japanese firms in the South African economy was 
not without controversy.
Kitazawa （1974） documents the major corporate Japanese support for South African 
industrialisation during the 1970s, which took two forms. The first involved the signing 
of long-term contracts to buy mineral resource yields from newly laid infrastructure and 
industrial schemes. In the early 1970s, for example, South African authorities undertook 
the Sishen-Saldanha Bay project that comprised the construction of an 860km railway line 
extending from a new, inland iron ore mine at Sishen to the coast, and the development of 
a steel mill at Saldanha Bay. Major Japanese iron and steel firms concluded an agreement 
with the state-run South African Iron and Steel Corporation （ISCOR） to buy semi-finished 
steel products and iron ore from ISCOR. Similar agreements were concluded with private 
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entities for the purchase of minerals linked to other large-scale projects. In the eastern 
Cape Province, for instance, purchases would be made of iron ore and manganiferous ore 
from the planned expansion of the St. Croix Terminal Harbour at Algoa Bay, and coal 
would be purchased from the Transvaal Coal Owners’ Association from their operations 
at Witbank in the eastern Transvaal （with a new railway connection to be built from 
Witbank to the new Richards Bay harbour）.
The second form of support consisted of the supply of heavy machinery to South African 
industry. Major examples include contracts with ISCOR to supply equipment for a 10-
year expansion plan, adopted in 1973, to increase iron and steel production. Corporations 
such as Mitsui Shipbuilding, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and 
Nippon Steel signed accords to sell ISCOR equipment such as furnaces and rolling mills, 
among others. In the same period, corporations such as Hitachi-Tokyo Shibaura signed 
agreements with the South African Electricity Supply Commission （ESCOM） to develop a 
large-scale power plant on the Orange River （Kitazawa, 1974）.
In 1968 the Japanese government was the first among the industrialised world to 
introduce a ban on direct investments in the South African economy by Japanese firms. 
This ban was stridently opposed by organised big business in Japan, who invoking the 
need to secure strategic resources for Japan’s domestic industry, lobbied the government 
to lift the ban （Agbi, 1982）. Claims that Japanese firms were obtaining uranium from 
South West Africa via South African channels drew scrutiny in Japan and internationally 
and prompted domestic campaigning against the firms involved （Kitazawa, 1982）. At the 
same time there is evidence that firms found ways to circumvent the official ban on direct 
investments in South Africa, either by attempting to base operations in neighbouring 
states, channelling investments through European or North American affiliates, or by using 
licensing agreements with local counterparts （Rogerson, 1993）. 
Afrikaner nationalism and the origins of the Toyota dynasty in South Africa
While progressive minded scholars have tended to criticise Japanese firms as being 
supportive of the apartheid regime’s import-substitution industrialisation and ultimately 
power consolidation during the 1960s through to 1980s （e.g. Kitazawa, 1982; Morikawa, 
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1984; Mukonoweshuro, 1991）, it is also important to appreciate the complex ways in 
which these economic ties were part of larger political-economic processes and deep-lying 
sociocultural dynamics. From the South African perspective this can illustrated with an 
account of the rise of Japanese automobiles in South Africa and its interrelationship with 
not only the extension of South Africa’s manufacturing sector from the 1960s onward, but 
also the rise of the Afrikaner industrialist class.
This account begins with the decision by the Afrikaner businessman, Albert Wessels, in 
the late 1950s to explore assembling cars in South Africa under manufacturer’s licence. 
Wessels had by then established himself as one of the prominent industrialists from the 
Afrikaans community. He started his corporate career as manager of the Volkshemde- 
en Klerefabriek （Veka） in 1940 （Wessels, 1987: 47）, a recently established Johannesburg-
based clothing factory that later became part of the Afrikaans corporate nexus （Du 
Plessis, 1964: 137）. By the end of the 1950s Veka had developed to the third largest 
clothing manufacturer in South Africa （Wessels, 1987: 94）. 
Wessels looked to extend his corporate activities through his involvement with major 
Afrikaans financing entities such as the Suid-Afrikaanse Spaar- en Voorskotbank Beperk 
（Sasbank, the roots of which can be traced to the ‘Helpmekaarbeweging’ that followed the 
Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914-1915 [see discussion by Grundlingh and Swart, 2009]）and 
the Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk （FVB） established in 1940 as part of larger efforts 
to invest in Afrikaners’ upliftment and economic self-sufficiency （O’ Meara, 1983: 191）. 
Wessels’ involvement with these financial bodies saw him become part of a small import 
financing concern （the Suid-Afrikaanse Finansieringskorporasie Beperk or Sasficor） which 
supported efforts by South African businessman to start local assembly of Datsun vehicles. 
Wessels himself started exploring the possibility of other Japanese automobile manufactur-
ing in South Africa. He settled, eventually, on Toyota. At the time, Toyota was increasing 
its international reach and started to prod American and European competitors for world 
market share （in later decades also in Ford and General Motors’ own domestic markets） 
（Toyota Motor Corporation, 1988）.
The South African automobile industry dates back to the 1920s with the establishment of 
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an assembly plant by Ford in the eastern Cape Province in 1924 and by General Motors 
（GM） in 1926. The industry has been a consistently important factor in the Union of South 
Africa’s economy （Du Plessis, 1964） as well as thereafter （Duncan, 1997）. Up until the 
1960s it was dominated by firms such as GM, Ford and Daimler Benz, but when Albert 
Wessels finally got the licence in 1961 from the parent firm in Japan to assemble Toyotas, 
this represented the first manufacturing entry by a Japanese automobile marque. It 
presaged the later expansion and ‘Japanification’ （Bell, 1990: 63） of the South African 
motor industry when, by the mid-1980s, Japanese automobile components and locally 
assembled vehicles made up more than half of the total industry （cited in Rogerson, 1993: 
104）.
In accordance with the agreement concluded with the Toyota Motor Corporation and 
subjected to import restrictions imposed by the South African Board of Trade and 
Industries, Albert Wessels and his associates could initially only import commercial, not 
any passenger vehicles, from Japan. These vehicles were sold through a newly established 
local sales company called Toyopet Commercials （Edms.） Beperk, the precursor to the 
later Toyota South Africa. Wessels （1987: 115） notes that the imported vehicles found a 
ready market since they were lighter and cheaper than the American vehicles on offer in 
South Africa at the time.
Sales continued apace so that by 1964 more than 4,500 units had been sold locally, which 
represented a market share of 12.9%. In 1965 the Board of Trade and Industries permitted 
the import of Toyota passenger vehicles on condition that they were locally assembled 
and carried local content of 45%. The Corona sedan was the first of the Toyota brand to 
be manufactured in South Africa. By 1968, Toyota South Africa had a firm footing with 
its commercial vehicles holding close to a quarter of the local market. By the early 1970s 
Toyota South Africa was the second largest automobile corporation in the country with 
total vehicle sales of more than 24,000 units. The firm was named as highest shareholder 
yield among the top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange （Wessels, 
1987: 114-118）.
The success of Toyota South Africa – and Albert Wessels’ role in it – had political 
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connotations too. It was read as the consolidation of an Afrikaner industrialist class 
that could feasibly rival white English corporates and forever lay to rest the so-called 
‘armblanke vraagstuk’ （or phenomenon of white poverty among Afrikaners）. Herman 
Giliomee （2010）, the South African historian, captures this when he writes ‘Daar 
was weining Afrikanerentrepreneurs...Afrikaners was ... swak verteenwoordig in die 
meeste witboordjie-betrekkings...[p5] Daar was ’n groot begeerte om te bewys dat 
die Afrikaners in die sakewêreld kon slaag’ [p4]. （There were very few Afrikaner 
entrepreneurs...Afrikaners were poorly represented in most white collar jobs.... There 
was a big desire to prove that Afrikaners could succeed in the corporate world.）Albert 
Wessels himself intimidated he, like other Afrikaners, was driven by the knowledge that 
‘our parents were subjugated （in the Anglo-Boer War） and deep in our consciousness 
an urge for rehabilitation arose. It developed into a desire to prove that you were at least 
the equal of the （English） victors and their descendants （Wessels, 1987: 12; translation by 
author）.3）
With his Toyota assembly licence in hand, Albert Wessels went on to build a dynasty 
which became one of the symbols of Afrikaner corporate success. This was a dynasty, 
importantly, that not only came to play a significant role in the larger South African 
automobile industry, but also became a significant component in the country’s 
manufacturing economy. In an assessment of the automobile industry in 1971, an observer 
noted that ‘the （motor） industry has an even wider impact on the economy. It is the 
national spearhead of import substitution, the catalyst for the growth of manufacturing 
industry ... and the blueprint for policies encouraging home-based industrial development’ 
（Griffiths, 1971, italics added）. Wessels’ role in initiating the assembly of Toyota vehicles 
in South Africa had larger ramifications for South African manufacturing and ultimately 
3 ） Albert Wessels’ autobiography starts off with a foreword by Dr Willem van Heerden, 
chairman of Perskor at the time, who wrote: ‘Afrikaner boys of our generation were all 
farmer folk. Those who went to study were destined to become clergyman, or doctors or 
lawyers. And now I am （in amazement about） ... the sophisticated places （the Afrikaner of 
today） find themselves... （and） planning, leading and overseeing the country’s advance. To 
fully grasp the distance that has been covered, one indeed has to look back the entire length 
of the road. One of the last terrains to be entered was that of the entrepreneur function in 
trade and manufacturing. Here Albert Wessels was not merely one of the pioneers, but one of 
the shiniest.’ （Translation by author）.
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for the influence of Japanese industry in the country during the late apartheid period.
There is an important history to relay about the South African automobile industry and 
its geographical and racial shaping of labour in the 1970s and 1980s （Duncan, 1997）; the 
impact of the Coloured Labour Preference policy in the Cape and manufacturers’ decision 
to establish automobile factories in other parts of the country; the role of the automobile 
sector in industrial/labour relations during the tumultuous period of the 1980s anti-
apartheid riots, and how this sector became a pillar for the re-entry of major Japanese 
firms in the post-apartheid South Africa in the 2000s （Cornelissen, 2004）. These all point to 
the diverse ways in which Japanese actors – corporate as well as state – and more broadly 
Japanese industrial interests indirectly and sometimes directly meshed with political and 
economic developments in South Africa.
Concluding remarks
This paper discussed a period in the history of Japanese-African engagement that has 
been well covered in the existing literature. The themes in the literature highlight how 
this history centred very strongly on the development of trade relations, particularly 
with apartheid South Africa, and that as a result was significantly shaped by the moral 
contestations around apartheid in the international arena. The ‘South Africa question’ – by 
which can be understood how Japanese authorities’ and firms’ dealings with the apartheid 
regime from roughly the late 1950s to the late 1980s framed Japan’s relations with the rest 
of the African continent in ways that were politically and diplomatically costly for Japan – 
has dominated Japan’s twentieth Century African ties.
The paper has sought to unpack the twentieth Century Japan-South Africa relationship 
further through an account of the way industrial processes in both states resonated and 
sometimes intertwined. By highlighting the geo-institutional conditions by which industrial 
ties between Japan and South Africa unfolded, and through the lens of the micro-
biographies of specific figures from the realm of big business, the connected industrial 
histories could partially be detailed. As noted by Duncan （1997: 2）, South African scholars 
have tended to overlook the value the deep analysis of specific economic industries could 
bring, and historiography has tended to favour structuralist accounts of group contestation. 
By adopting a perspective as here, some insights could be gained into the dynamics of 
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industrial development in key periods of South Africa’s development. Further research 
could interweave macro-level political-economy accounts （diplomacy, state-making, policy, 
etc.） with other levels of analysis to give fuller account of the making of commodities, the 
creation and shaping of markets, labour relations and consumer values in the Japan-South 
Africa relationship. 
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